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Abstract
Taking the Ecological Footprint (EF) as a broad measure of environmental
impact of economic activity, there is substantial progress in decoupling eco-
nomic output from environmental impact. However, this progress has been too
slow to compensate the negative environmental impact of economic growth.
But since mid of 2000s the EF declines in the OECD countries, and the global
EF increase is driven by emerging countries, i.e. China. However, the decline
could be mainly explained by a GDP growth slowdown. To achieve a signif-
icant reduction (comparable to the goals of the Paris Agreement) a further
slowdown could be necessary. Moreover, the paper investigates the role of
globalization because the greening of production in OECD countries could
be due to a shift of dirty industries to non-OECD countries. Thus OECD
countries are net importers of the EF embodied in traded goods. However,
the amount of net EF imports is too small and not correlated with the eco-
productivity of production. As ecological productivity is strongly correlated
with enforced environmental policy, globalization could be used as a vehicle
to promote eco-productivity also in non-OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
The idea of “green growth” is here defined as a process of decoupling economic ac-
tivities from environmental pressure in all its various forms. Such a decoupling is fa-
cilitated by two interrelated processes: technological progress and structural change.
The former means that production becomes less resource- and pollution-intensive
while the latter indicates that the structure and quality of the produced bundle of
goods and services changes in time in favor of more sustainable consumption pat-
terns. If decoupling is successful then growing economic activities are possible on the
same or even declining level of environmental pressure. However, from both, theo-
retical and empirical perspectives, many authors are skeptical about the possibilities
of decoupling, and they advocate zero growth or even degrowth (Ayres 1996, Daly
2013, Mart´ınez-Alier et al. 2010). The main argument are various rebound effects
such that each decoupling success further stimulates growth which then erodes the
positive environmental effect. Moreover, diminishing returns to scale of decoupling
effort will necessarily lead to rebound effects (Pasche 2002). On the other hand,
as the GDP doesn’t say anything about its composition and production conditions,
why should it be an imperative to shrink it? Moreover, one important source of
decoupling is technical progress which is also generally the long-term determinant
of economic growth. So any sort of policy which aims to degrow has to prevent
people from being creative and innovating – which is also the motor for greening
the technologies. Therefore, Van den Bergh (2011) critically reviews the degrowth
literature and argues in favor of “a-growth”.
Another strand of critical discussion is related to the role of globalization. Rich
countries are accused to use international specialization and trade patterns to get rid
of the dirty industries which are then relocated to poor countries with less veto power
against ecological degradation. This creates the illusion of not being responsible any
longer (Andersson and Lindroth 2001). The “ecologically imbalanced” trade leads to
an “anti-trade bias” in the discussion about sustainable development (for a critical
review see Van den Bergh and Verbruggen 1999, and Van den Bergh and Grazi
2014). In the political debate, advocates of degrowth or post-growth are typically
also the critics of globalization and the role of the rich (OECD) countries in the
global trade system.
This paper uses the Ecological Footptint (EF) as a broad measure for most kinds of
environmental impact of production and consumption. The rather complex method
of footprint calculation is explained e.g. by Wackernagel and Rees (1996) and Jor-
genson et al. (2002). Very briefly summarized, the basic idea is that the biosphere
delivers various natural resources and also serves as a sink for pollution. The bio-
capacity for doing so is limited and depends on the type of land. The various
production and consumption activities make use of these natural services which
means that they occupy “land” which is measured in Global Hectare [gha]. The
gha represents the average productivity of the ecologically productive areas within
a region. Aggregating different forms of nature use can thus be made comparable
as they are expressed in gha which are necessary to maintain these activities. The
aggregation of all forms of nature use is the Ecological Footprint which can then be
compared with capacity of the existing biosphere, also measured in gha. If the rela-
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tionship is larger than one, the (world) economy needs more than the existing land,
e.g. the entire globe, to maintain their operations, in other words: the activities are
unsustainable.
Though becoming a popular measure which is increasingly used also in academic
empirical research, the methodology is criticized for various reasons (see Moffatt
2000, Jorgenson et al. 2002, Van den Bergh and Grazi 2014). This discussion is not
reviewed here. The Global Footprint Network which develops and uses this concept,
is aware of the critique and acknowledges new insights in the further development of
the footprint (Galli et al. 2016, Manchini et al. 2016). The argument for using the
EF here is simply that (a) there is no other convincing broad measure which tries to
capture the entire environmental impact in all its forms, (b) the concept makes the
highly relevant difference between the EF of production and the EF of consumption
which will play an important role for analyzing trade patterns, and finally (c) the
detailed data are publicly available for nearly all countries since 1961.
One problem in the public debate, but also in the semi-academic literature, is that
arguments are often not backed by rigorous empirical evidence. This paper provides
some empirical material where it can be seen simply by “eyeballing” which narratives
about the role of the OECD countries for the disastrous development of the global
footprint is in line with the data and which is not. No econometric analysis is
provided as a couple of common claims can easily be (dis)proven by looking to the
graphs. All data are obtained from the National Footprint Account 2018 dataset
provided by the Global Footprint Network, the Penn World Table Version 9.0, and
the OECD environmental data and indicators database. All footprints are measured
in Global Hectare (gha). I don’t take the per capita values because sustainability
requires a reduction of the total pressure on the environment.
2 The Footprint Development in OECD Countries
Figure 1 shows the increasing paths of the world EF including the EF of the OECD
countries2. However, it can be seen that since mid of 2000s the OECD’s footprint
is slightly declining. Therefore, the EF values in 2014 are on a similar level than
in the mid of 1990ies although the OECD’s real GDP increased by more than 50%.
This implies that the increase of the world EF by 40% between mid of 1990ies and
2014 is solely due to the non-OECD countries, i.e. China. Adding just China to the
OECD’s path leads to the same upwards trend than for the entire world. As can
be seen from the statistics of the major OECD countries (USA, Canada, European
OECD members), a stabilization or even decline of the EF can be observed even
before the 2000s (see data.footprintnetwork.org).
Growing GDP with stagnating or even declining EF is a strong indicator for de-
coupling success, measured by the eco-productivity. The eco-productivity is here
defined as the relation of the output-side real GDP to the Ecological Footprint (as
an input variable). As the EF of production is typically different to the EF of con-
sumption, both productivity measures are used. Figure 2 shows the development of
2See appendix for the list of OECD countries in this sample.
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Figure 1: Ecological Footprint development 1961-2014 (in gha)
the productivities. Although there seem to be an impressing progress, the de-linking
has been overcompensated by economic growth which might include e.g. rebound
effects. However, this does not hold true for the time after the mid of 2000s where
the EF declines.
Figure 2 shows that the labor productivity has increased by far more than the eco-
productivity. This indicates that the focus of technical progress is on the expensive
input factor labor which should be saved. Using the biosphere as a production
factor is still too cheap so that the incentives for developing cleaner technologies
and products are low. However, the discrepancy is explained mainly by the 1960ies
and early 1970ies if we are looking to the growth rates of the productivities. Since
at least two decades the labor productivity growth rates have a slightly declining
trend (“secular stagnation”) while the eco-productivity growth, though being more
volatile, remains on a level which is meanwhile larger than for labor productivity
growth (fig. 2, right).
The increase of real GDP/EF relation does not necessarily imply that economies
invested into R&D to reduce natural resource inputs or emissions. It is simply a side
effect of the increased labor productivity which pushes the numerator (real GDP).
Figure 3 shows the close correlation between both productivities until the beginning
of the 2000s. After that, the eco-efficiency growth is more pronounced compared
to the declining labor productivity growth (compare also with r.h.s. of figure 2).
This points to increasing efforts towards greener production. These efforts could
be partially explained by more strict environmental policy which makes the use of
nature more expensive. Figure 4 shows that eco-productivity and the environmental
taxes (in Million USD - 2010 PPP) of the OECD countries are highly correlated.
These taxes (e.g. energy taxes) serve as a rough proxy because other non-tax policy
measures such like technical regulations also contribute to higher costs of nature
use.
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Figure 2: Eco-productivity in OECD 1961-2014 (1961=100)
One question is whether the higher eco-productivity of production in the OECD
could be partially explained by shifting dirty industries to poorer countries which
have lax environmental policy standards and less veto power of the population
against environmental demise. OECD countries could use global trade as a ve-
hicle to green their production to the expense of poorer countries, but to import
the dirty products. In such a case we should observe (a) that the gap between EF
of production and consumption becomes larger, in other words: the EF net imports
embodied in traded goods increase, (b) the decline of the EF of production is not
accompanied by a decline of the EF of consumption, and (c) that the growth of
eco-productivity of production is explained to a significant extent by these net EF
imports.
There is not much evidence for these arguments. There is also a decline of the EF of
consumption, see figure 7. The eco-productivity of production and consumption grow
with nearly the same rates, see figure 2. In fact, OECD countries are net importers
of the EF embodied in the traded goods, see figure 5. So there is some truth in
the argument of externalizing dirty industries to non-OECD countries. But this is
perfectly in line with the predictions of standard trade theory based on comparative
advantages (Dam, Pasche, Werlich 2017). The main driver of this specialization
pattern can be seen in the role of strictly enforced environmental policy which leads
to comparative cost disadvantages for dirty parts of the production chain and thus
creates specialization effects (see also Copeland and Taylor 1994). In order to detect
these comparative advantages regarding the input factors empirically, Leamer (1980)
argued that one has to compare the factors embodied in the produced and the
consumed bundle of goods. So a a positive net export of a factor embodied in
traded goods indicates a comparative advantages regarding this factor.
The coefficient for enforced environmental policy is strongly correlated with the real
income while the real income is highly correlated with eco-productivity of production
(and consumption). So the ecologically “imbalanced” trade is a natural outcome
of effective successful environmental policy in the OECD countries rather than a
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Figure 3: Labor- versus eco-productivity in OECD 1961-2014
scurrilous neo-colonial strategy of the rich countries. In addition, also the larger
abundance of biocapacity in relation to labor in non-OECD countries contributes to
these comparative advantages (see Dam, Pasche, and Werlich (2017) for details).
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Figure 6: Net EF exports OECD versus China
Figure 5 also shows that the net EF imports (negative net EF exports) are more or
less uncorrelated with the eco-productivity. Although they seem to have a common
long-run trend, the growth rates and their volatility are significantly different. All
time series are normalized to 100 in the year 1961, so we should observe a significant
impact of EF net imports on the productivity especially in times of stagnation
or reduction – but we don’t see it. The EF imports are declining since the mid
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Figure 4: Environmental taxes and eco-productivity since 1994
of 2000ies3. In 2014 they are on the same absolute level than at the end of the
1980ies (implying that they are on a much lower level when measured per GDP
unit). Hence the argument that the greening of production is to the expense of
the non-OECD countries contradicts the empirical picture of the last decade. The
greening of the production happened despite declining net EF imports. In contrast,
emerging countries such like China also became large net importers of the EF, see
figure 6. Furthermore, the absolute role of ecologically “imbalanced” trade, reflected
in the net EF imports of the OECD is quite small as can be seen in figure 7.
An important part of the Ecological Footprint is the Carbon Footprint (CF) which
is reported separately in the NFA 2018 database. As the use of fossil resources is
highly relevant for the climate change, one should have a look whether the same
trends also hold true for the CF. Figure 8 shows that this is the case. After many
decades of increasing CF of consumption and production, and increasing net imports
of the Carbon Footprint in traded goods, there seem to be a turning point in the
mid of 2000s. However, on a global scale this decline is by far overcompensated by
emerging countries such like China. This is roughly in line with the result of Xu and
Dietzenbacher (2014) which is based on a much more sophisticated methodology.
However, their dataset ends in 2007, so they didn’t detect a turning point.
All these results indicate that decoupling economic activities from environmental
pressure in the OECD countries is possible, and that after mid of 2000s this pro-
cess led to an absolute decline of the EF and the CF. It was shown that the eco-
productivity has permanently grown, and that the outsourcing of dirty industries
to non-OECD countries played a very small and even declining role. Moreover, the
trend of net EF imports has reversed since the mid of 2000s. But does all that
mean that OECD countries invested a lot of effort into greener technologies and
products? Figure 9 plots the GDP growth rates against the growth rate of the EF
which are mostly negative after 2005. The graphic indicates that decoupling became
3The other spike of a decline is due to the global recession in the early 1080es.
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Figure 5: Eco-productivity and net EF imports in OECD (1961 = 100)
successful mainly because of a slowdown of economic growth which experiences the
same “secular stagnation” trend like the labor productivity growth in figure 2. All
negative growth rates of the EF are associated with GDP growth less than 2.5%.
Without this slowdown, the high growth of eco-productivity would have been over-
compensated like in the decades before. Therefore, the “greening of growth” should
not be interpreted as a story of success. Those OECD countries which suffer from
secular stagnation aim to promote growth, and the largest economy in the sample,
the United States of America, left the Paris Agreement. So one could expect that
it will become very difficult to maintain the reversed trend.
Figure 9 (right side, red line) shows the development of the EF (production) for the
case that the GDP would have developed since 2000 with the average growth rate of
the 1990ies (3.3%) but keeping the realized eco-efficiency values of the sample. Even
though the eco-productivity has increased significantly no turning point would have
been achieved. So the declining EF can be mainly explained by the GDP growth
slowdown.
3 Policy implications
The growth of eco-productivity is impressing at the first sight. Although higher
environmental standards and strictly enforced environmental policy contributed a
lot to make production process and also consumption cleaner, a significant part
of the eco-productivity increase is simply explained by the even more impressing
increase of labor productivity which leads to higher a GDP (keeping the EF con-
stant). But labor productivity alone cannot be the reason as the secular stagnation
trend indicates. There is still much room for genuine technical progress towards
more sustainable production. According to the economic logic, efforts in R&D are
partially driven by the incentive to save expensive input factors. The labor pro-
ductivity slowdown, however, is not because labor became cheaper but because of
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Figure 7: The role of net EF imports in OECD
declining marginal returns of innovation (see Cantner et al. 2018). In fact, labor
is still relative expensive compared to the use of nature where the costs are still
(globally) externalized to a very large extent. An even stricter environmental policy
but also ecological tax reforms, thus rising the private cost of using nature, might
help to shift the focus of technical progress and structural change towards cleaner
and sustainable production.
The success of a declining Ecological Footprint can be partially explained by a slow-
down of economic growth. Advocates of a degrowth paradigm claim that decoupling
and green growth is an illusion because of rebound effects. Although I do not share
the degrowth position one has to consider that since the mid of 1970ies where many
governments of OECD countries started to develop environmental policies and stim-
ulate a decoupling, there has been no success (in terms of an absolute decline of the
footprint) for three decades, and the recent success since mid of 2000s is due to
low growth (but not degrowth). So growth is still highly problematic despite all
appreciated efforts. The problem in many fields of public policy such like managing
public debt (Pasche 2018), maintaining social security systems, fighting unemploy-
ment, or redistributional policies depend more or less on growing economies. This
automatically leads to a conflict with green growth and decoupling. As sustainable
development can be seen as an imperative, the conclusion should be to think about
how the tasks of public policy mentioned above could be made independent from
growth. This is a question of institutional design of a social market economy.
The Paris Agreement to protect global warming commits the signing countries to
achieve an emission level in 2030 which is 40% less than in 1990. Although the
Carbon Footprint is not identical with CO2 emissions, let us assume that the same
40% goal also holds true for the CF. Given the values for 1990 and 2014, an annual
CF growth rate of -4% is required to achieve the goal in 2030. Algebraically, the
CF growth rate is the GDP growth rate minus the growth rate of eco-productivity
(GDP/CF). The red line in figure 10 indicates all combinations of GDP growth and
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Figure 9: Reduction of EF due to GDP growth slowdown
eco-productivity growth such that the CF is reduced by 4% p.a. With few exceptions
all realized combinations in the past are above this threshold. In the period 2010-
2014 the average GDP growth was about 2%, and the eco-productivity growth rate
about 3% (therefore leading to a decline of the CF). But this implies that c.p. either
the speed of eco-productivity growth has to be doubled from 3% to 6%, or degrowth
of -1% is required to achieve the goal (or a compromise, see arrows in figure 10). As
doubling of the growth of eco-productivity is very ambitious and hard to achieve,
a further GDP growth slowdown is then required. Taking into consideration that
many OECD countries would like to spur growth (e.g. the stagnating Japan), it
becomes rather unlikely that the 40% reduction goal could be achieved.
The empirical picture shows that strictly enforced environmental policy, by making
pollution intensive industries more costly, induces a change of the pattern of compar-
ative advantages, and thus making OECD countries becoming net importers of the
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Ecological Footprint, in other words: their footprint of consumption is larger than
their footprint of production. As most OECD countries have a lower abundance of
biocapacity per capita, these ecological “imbalances” in trade should not be seen
as a problem per se but they could also enhance the global efficiency of nature use
(Dam, Pasche, Werich 2017). On the one hand, specialization and trade is another
source of global growth and insofar problematic for the EF. On the other hand, trade
is facilitated by bi- or multilateral trade agreements. These could serve as a vehicle
to “green” the production also in non-OECD countries. In the last decades, compli-
ance to technical norms became a more and more important issue. Such (e.g. ISO)
norms or standards could (and partially do) also define environmental standards of
production and requirements of environmental reporting, and norm compliance is a
requirement for market access.
Many politicians and some economists see such technical norms as “trade barriers”
as they are creating additional costs in case of compliance, and prevent trade in case
of non-compliance. However, it is much more reasonable to argue that such norms
are a necessary vehicle to internalize global environmental costs in case of globally
dispersed production chains. If the final good should be produced under more or
less sustainable conditions (which might also include social and labor standards),
this has to be guaranteed for the entire production chain. This requires appropriate
instruments such like norms or standards. The empirical picture shows that espe-
cially the emerging and developing countries are now driving up the Carbon and
the Ecological Footprint. Therefore, it is not meaningful to fight against globaliza-
tion but to use global trade linkages to promote greener production also in other
countries via norms. Fricke and Chapman (2017) have shown that the “ability to
comply” with such norms might be an important factor for the development of poor
countries. In order to attract higher value-added parts of the production chain,
poorer countries have an incentive to comply with such environmental (and social)
standards.
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Appendix
Country sample Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States. Other countries which joined the
OECD much later than 1961 have not been con-
sidered.
Calculation of labor
productivity
output-side real GDP / (Average Annual Hours
Worked by Persons Engaged × Number of Persons
Engaged); data from Penn World Tables 9.0
Calculation of eco-
productivity
output-side real GDP / Ecological Footprint (of
production or consumption)
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